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Abstract
In this work, Einstein’s view of geometry as a physical geometry is taken into account
in the analysis  of several issues related to the notions of inertial  motion and inertial
reference  frame.  Einstein’s  physical  geometry  enables  a  non-conventional  view  on
Euclidean geometry (as the geometry associated to inertial motion and inertial reference
frames) and on the uniform time. Also, by taking into account the implications of this
view of geometry as a physical geometry, it is presented a critical reassessment of the
so-called boostability assumption (implicit according to Einstein in the formulation of
the theory), and also of ‘alternative’ derivations of the Lorentz transformations that do
not take into account the so-called ‘light postulate’. Finally, it is considered the issue of
the eventual conventionality of the one-way speed of light or, what is the same, the
conventionality of simultaneity (within the same inertial reference frame). It turns out
that it is possible to consider the (possible) conventionality of distant simultaneity as a
case of conventionality of geometry (in Einstein’s reinterpretation of Poincaré’s views).
By  taking  into  account  synchronization  procedures  that  do  not  rely  on  the  light
propagation (which is necessary in the derivation of the Lorentz transformations without
the ‘light postulate’), it can be shown that the synchronization of distant clocks does not
include any conventional element. This implies that the whole of chronogeometry (and,
because of this, the physical part of the theory) does not have any conventional element
in it, and it is a physical chronogeometry.
 
1 Introduction: inertial motion and inertial reference frames
A central notion to understand the physics and mathematics of classical mechanics and
the theory of relativity1 is that of inertial motion. According to these theories, material
bodies (i.e. physical systems that have inertial mass) can be in a very specific (state of)
motion that cannot be distinguished from rest; both are only meaningful as the relative
state of inertial  motion or inertial  rest between different material  bodies: there is no
notion of absolute rest. Any material body in inertial motion, let us call it an inertial
body, can be chosen to be an inertial ‘reference frame’ relative to which the motions of
other bodies (inertial or not) are described. 
1  Instead of naming  Einstein’s two theories as special  relativity and general  relativity,  in this work,
adopting Fock (1959) terminology, we refer to the theory of relativity and the theory of gravitation. In this
work, besides some references to classical mechanics, we address the theory of relativity not Einstein’s
gravitation theory.
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The extraordinary specificity of inertial motion is made clear by the so-called law of
inertia of classical mechanics or the theory of relativity: an inertial body is at rest or in
uniform rectilinear motion in relation to all other inertial bodies.
As  it  is  well  known,  the  development  and  clarification  of  the  notion  of  inertial
reference frame was made in the late nineteenth century, and is due, in particular, to
Neumann,  Lange  and Thomson (see,  e.g.,  DiSalle  1990,  140-1).2 Lange  defined an
inertial reference frame in terms of three inertial bodies in relative motion.  A fourth
inertial body will be at rest or in uniform rectilinear motion in relation to the inertial
reference  frame  determined  by  the  three  inertial  bodies.  This  definition  of  inertial
reference frame is particularly interesting because it stresses the point that there is no
notion of absolute rest available. As Barbour writes, inertial bodies partake the ‘cosmic
drift’  (Barbour 1989,  667);  what  we have is  a  very specific  relative  motion  or  rest
between all the inertial bodies.
In Lange’s approach, an inertial reference frame is defined in terms of the law of
inertia (Newton’s first law), and is only implicitly related to Newton’s other laws of
motion:  an  inertial  body is  a  body subjected  to  no force,  which,  in  this  dynamical
context, we will also refer to as a free body. With Thomson’s approach (completed by
R. F. Muirhead),  we can consider the whole of the laws of motion as asserting the
possibility of determining inertial reference frames even if there are no actual inertial
bodies in nature (DiSalle 1990, 140; DiSalle 2009).3
One example of the construction of an inertial reference frame from the observed
motions  of  non-inertial  bodies,  using  Newton’s  laws  of  mechanics,  is  that  of
determining a local  inertial  reference frame in which it  is  possible to determine the
Earth’s polar motion and rotation. 
From the  observed motions  (in  relation  to  the  Earth)  of  a  network of  artificial
satellites orbiting the Earth one constructs an (ideal) inertial reference frame (Barbour
1989,  665-6).  One  calculates  the  non-inertial  motions  of  the  satellites,  due  to  the
gravitational  field  of  the  Earth,  the  Sun,  and  the  Moon and other  non-gravitational
causes  (Major  1998,  437-8),  arriving  at  the  relative  inertial  motions  between  the
satellites. This procedure can be seen as determining a set of (ideal) inertial bodies, each
corresponding to each satellite, and constituting an (ideal) inertial reference frame, in
relation to which the polar motion and rotation of the Earth can be determined.4 There is
no circularity in this procedure since the orbital motion of the satellites is calculated
without taking into account the motion of the Earth’s rotation axis, whose effect is taken
to be neglectable in comparison to the totality of gravitational and non-gravitational
effects. 
We can check the validity of this procedure by comparing the Earth’s polar motion
and rotation as determined by the network of satellites and by other reference frames
(taken to be inertial). In fact, determinations of the Earth’s polar motion and rotation by
the present-day 'fixed stars' or even more distant quasars and radio sources are in good
agreement with the results obtained with the satellites’ reference frame (Barbour 1989,
667-8).
2 In this work the notions of inertial motion and inertial reference frame are considered in relation to
Einstein’s physical geometry. For a historical account of the law of inertial see, e.g., Coelho (2007) and
included references.
3 We can adopt exactly the same approach in the context of the theory of relativity: the law of inertia is
part of a whole that gives the dynamical description of motions.
4 To determine the motion of the Earth in the satellites’ reference frame, this frame must be a spatial
reference frame and have a time coordinate. In fact, each satellite is equipped with an atomic clock that
gives the time at each satellite, being all the clocks synchronized (see, e.g., Major 1998, 432).  
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An  important  aspect  of  the  definition  of  inertial  reference  frame  in  terms  of
Newton’s laws as a whole or the theory of relativity, which is made clear by practical
procedures to determine a local inertial reference frame, is that the inertial reference
frame is  only meaningfully defined and determinable  in  relation  to  material  bodies.
Conceptually,  the  notion  of  inertial  reference  frame  is  dependent  on  the  notion  of
material body. This notion corresponds in the theory’s structure to that of a real body as
referred to in experimentation and observation, in which, e.g., a local inertial reference
frame is determined by taking into account the observed relative motions of real bodies
(the Earth, artificial  satellites, etc). As Barbour writes, regarding this last point,  "the
ideal  reference  body  is  immaterial,  a  mathematical  construct,  but  is  nevertheless
obtained by means of a perfectly real body, with which is not possible to dispense"
(Barbour 1989, 660). Following astronomers, Barbour refers to this aspect of the notion
of inertial reference frame as the materialization of the inertial reference frame (Barbour
1989, 652). Taking into account that this materialization is possible only because the
notion of inertial reference frame arises in the context of a theoretical structure (e.g.
Newton’s laws) that describes the motion of material bodies, we will adopt the term
materiality instead of materialization to stress the conceptual and experimental relation
of the notion of inertial reference frame to the notion of material body.
2 The rectilinearity of the inertial motion
As mentioned, the motion of an inertial (free) body in relation to an inertial reference
frame is characterized by being rectilinear and uniform. Both Lange and, previous to
him, Neumann made an analysis of the inertial motion by considering these two aspects
in separate (Torretti 1983, 16-7).5 In this work it is adopted the same approach. 
We will  consider  three  notions  of  straight  line:  (a)  phenomenologically  (i.e.  as
experienced) we face objects that we consider, e.g., straight or curved: a curved bow, a
straight rod, and so on. From an experimental point of view, one might consider that a
rod is straight1 in its length to the required or possible accuracy, and that its height and
depth are much smaller than its length. We might even take a particular straight1 rod to
be the realization of a length unit;6 (b) let us consider an extended material body in
inertial  motion.  Let  us  stick  two ranging poles  in  the  material  body.  Now we take
several  straight1 rods  that  experimentally  are  always  congruent  (i.e.  rods  that  when
compared always have the same length). We make a Gunter (surveyor’s) chain of rods
connecting the extremities of the ranging poles. Adopting the rods as our measure of
length, the straight2 line between the two material  ‘points’ corresponds to the smaller
distance (i.e. the smaller number of rods). In this way, we call straight2 to the ‘line’
made by a chain of rods that  needs the smaller  number of rods to connect  the two
ranging poles; (c) Let us consider a gedanken (thought) experiment.  We have a free
body in inertial motion in relation to our extended inertial body. According to the law of
inertia, the free body has a straight3 trajectory in relation to the extended body. It turns
out that it is possible to move the extended body in a way that the straight3 trajectory of
the free body almost coincides with the chain of rods connecting the end points of the
two ranging poles: the straight3 trajectory of the free body is identical to the straight2
line between two material ‘points’ that makes their distance the smallest when measured
with straight1 rods. 
5 This is also the case with d’Alembert (see Coelho 2007).
6 In fact, the unit of length was defined in terms of a platinum-iridium bar until 1960 (see, e.g., Giacomo
1984).
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In all three notions of straight line we are considering material bodies in inertial
motion. Since in b) and c) one considers a disposition of rods in relation to an extended
material body in inertial motion, the straight1 rods are also being considered in inertial
motion. It is correct that there are moments, e.g. when moving the extended body so that
the straight3 trajectory and the straight2 line almost coincide, in which a material body is
not in inertial motion, but changing from one inertial state to another. This is something
to be addressed in section 4, but by now we will address another issue; that of what is
the geometry that corresponds to the possibilities of disposition of rods that we observe
in the case of inertial motions?
Let us consider three straight2 chains of straight1 rods. Let one of the chains of rods
maintain its state of inertial motion. Let us move the second chain of rods so that its end
point touches the mid point of the first chain. We say that the second segment of rods is
perpendicular to the first if for any point of the second segment, two other identical
segments touching this point will touch different points of the first segment that are at
an  equal  distance  from its  mid  point.  By a  similar  procedure  one  moves  the  third
straight2 chain of straight1 rods and locates it in relation to the other two straight2 chains
so that it is perpendicular to them. 
These three perpendicular chains of rods can be seen as a spatial inertial reference
frame.7  If we consider, as a gedanken experiment, the disposition of rods, making for
example figures in any plane located within the inertial reference frame,8 it turns out
that these figures are the same (congruent) independently of the chosen plane and their
position and orientation in the plane. We find out that the disposition of the straight1
rods in  inertial  motion  corresponds to  the Euclidean geometry when identifying  the
straight1 rods with line segments.
According  to  Poincaré  this  conclusion  would  be  wrong.  In  his  view  the
(mathematical)  congruences  in  a  geometrical  space  can  be  such  that  correspond  to
Euclidean geometry or, e.g., Lobatschewsky’s geometry (Poincaré 1902, 92-3); There is
in Poincaré’s view no relation between the concrete material congruence that one can
observe and the congruence of geometrical figures. In particular, one cannot relate a
concrete  material  congruence  to  a  mathematical  congruence  (Paty  1992,  11).
Experimentation  does  not  preclude  any geometry,  since  a  theory  of  physics  can  be
reformulated when changing the adopted geometry in a way that it  still  agrees with
experimental  results.  This  does  not  mean  that  to  Poincaré  geometry  and  physical
theories are on an equal footing. As Paty writes, to Poincaré there is no interdependence
of  geometry  and  physical  theory,  what  we  have  is  “a  dependence  of  the  physical
formulation on the geometrical definitions” (Paty 1992, 12).9
7 Let us consider two (spatial) inertial reference frames built this way. Their relative inertial motion is
rectilinear and also there is no relative rotation between them (Torretti 1983, 17; Barbour 1989, 651). If
this is not the case, a free body with rectilinear motion in relation to one of the inertial reference frames
will not be in rectilinear motion in relation to the other. In this way, the notion of rectilinearity employed
has associated that of rigidity of orientation. This is due to the fact that the length, height, and depth of a
material body (i.e. its three dimensionality)  are not abstracted away in the notions of inertial body or
inertial reference frame. 
8 We can construct a plane, e.g., by starting with one of the straight 2 chains, and disposing rods along
another perpendicular straight2 chain, i.e. by making successive chains of rods that are ‘parallel’ to one of
the ‘axes’, with all the chains having their origin in another ‘axis’. One then moves this plane within the
inertial reference frame to any position and with any orientation one wants.
9 In fact, e.g., the formulation of the law of inertia seems to be possible by just assuming the homogeneity
of the (mathematical) space and time associated to the inertial reference frames. By taking into account
Noether’s theorem, Baccetti, Tate, and Visser (2012, 6-8) argue that the homogeneity of space and time is
a necessary presupposition for the notion of inertial reference frame. If one considers, as in this work, that
the notion of inertial reference frame is defined by taking into account a theory as a whole, then it might
still be possible to formulate, e.g., the theory of relativity in terms of a non-Euclidean anisotropic but
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To  Einstein,  even  if  Poincaré’s  ideas  are  appealing,  the  present  stage  of
development of physics precludes his conventionality of geometry (Paty 1993, 304-5).
To Einstein, Euclidean geometry is not, like to Poincaré, an abstract geometry (i.e. pure
mathematics), it is a practical geometry: the geometry of the disposition of practically
rigid bodies (that are, implicitly, inertial). As such it is a physical science.10 The crucial
point that warrants this view of geometry as practical/physical geometry, is Einstein’s
realization that, at the present stage of development of mathematical physics, the notion
of  straight1 rod  (like  the  notion  of  clock)  enters  the  theory’s  construction  as  an
independent concept that is theoretically self-sufficient (Einstein 1921, 212-3; Einstein
1969, 59-61), and not as a complex physical system that is described by the theory.
Einstein considers that ideally mathematical physics should be constructed as Poincaré
says,  by  adopting  a  basic  abstract  mathematical  structure  Ga on  top  of  which  the
physical theory P is built. The straight1 rods should not be related directly to Ga but to
Ga + P, e.g. as a solution of mathematical equations. In Einstein’s reinterpretation of
Poincaré’s conventionality of geometry (Paty 1992, 7-8), one could choose a different
geometry Gnew that when taken together with a reformulation of the physics Pref would
give exactly the same prediction of experimental results. Using mathematical symbols
in a heuristic way the idea is that Ga + P = Gnew + Pref.
Einstein calls the attention to the fact that what should be a theoretical construct
enters the theory as a self-sufficient concept already at the level of a physical geometry
Gp, since it is established a correspondence between the concrete straight1 rod and a
mathematical element of length dr (see, e.g., Einstein 1913b, 157; Einstein 1955, 63-4).
In this way, the issue of what is the appropriate geometry becomes an experimental
matter. One finds out that, in the case of rods in inertial motion, the experimental laws
of disposition of rods correspond, for small distances, to the Euclidean geometry.11
Until  this  moment we have only considered inertial  bodies. Einstein argues that
Euclidean geometry applies only to the case of inertial motions:
in a [material] system of reference rotating relatively to an inert system, the laws of
disposition of rigid bodies do not correspond to the rules of Euclidean geometry on
account of the Lorentz contraction; thus if we admit non-inert systems we must abandon
Euclidean geometry. (Einstein 1921, 211)12
In fact, as it is well known, in Einstein’s gravitation theory, the straight3 trajectories and
the straight2 lines are geodesics; they are the straight lines of the Euclidean geometry
(see, e.g., Einstein 1955, 78).
homogeneous spatial  geometry,  i.e.  not  in terms of the Minkowski geometry but of a flat  Finslerian
geometry (Budden 1997, 330).
10 As Einstein mentions, Poincaré takes the fact that real solid bodies in nature are not rigid to advocate
for a view of geometry in which geometrical objects do not correspond to real bodies (Einstein 1921,
212). As Paty stresses, “geometry, in Poincaré’s conception is completely disconnected from measurable
properties of physical bodies” (Paty 1992, 11); however, as Einstein calls the attention to, “it is not a
difficult task to determine the physical state of a measuring-rod so accurately that its behaviour relatively
to other measuring-bodies shall be sufficiently free from ambiguity to allow it to be substituted for the
'rigid' body. It is to measuring-bodies of this kind that statements as to rigid bodies must be referred”
(Einstein 1921, 237).
11 In Einstein’s words, “solid bodies are related, with respect to their possible dispositions, as are bodies in
Euclidean geometry of three dimensions”(Einstein 1921, 235)
12 This does not mean that while for an accelerated reference frame the associated geometry is not the
Euclidean  geometry  there  is  not  a  ‘background’  of  Euclidean  geometry  available.  The  accelerated
reference frame coordinate system, which has a spatial bounded domain of application, is related by some
transformation to any inertial reference frame coordinate system (see, e.g., Callahan 2000, 143-65).
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In Einstein’s approach one cannot dissociate the physical geometry from the motion
of  the  material  bodies.  In  particular,  the  Euclidean  geometry  gives  the  laws  of
disposition of inertial rigid bodies. That this was Einstein’s view can also be seen by
taking into account his notions of 'body of reference' and 'space of reference'. In the
context of his theory of relativity,  Einstein avoids speaking of space in abstract: “the
ensemble of all continuations of a body A we can designate as the space of the body A”
(Einstein 1955, 6). All bodies can be seen to be in the 'space' of an arbitrarily chosen
body A; Einstein gives the example of the Earth's surface (and atmosphere).13 In his
approach, the space of reference is Euclidean and the admissible bodies of reference are
inertial (Paty 1992, 24-5).
We can see Einstein's  notion of body of reference as an example of the above-
mentioned materiality of inertial reference frames, but going one step further. The space
of reference belonging to the body of reference cannot be abstracted from it to the point
of disregarding its state of motion. Euclidean geometry as the physical geometry of the
disposition of material bodies is only valid according to Einstein in the case of inertial
motions. As soon as one goes beyond inertial motion, Euclidean geometry is not valid.
We cannot  see  Euclidean  geometry  as  a  static  disembodied  mathematical  structure.
Euclidean geometry, considered in relation to physics, cannot be thought independently
of the inertial motion of material bodies. In this context, we can see the rectilinearity of
the inertial motion as pointing to the Euclidean character of the physical geometry of
material bodies in inertial motion.
3 The uniformity of inertial motion
The other key aspect of the inertial motion that Neumann and Lange try to clarify is that
of the uniformity of this motion. As it is well known Neumann proposed a 'definition' of
equal times based on the law of inertia: equal times are those in which a free body,
moving in relation to any adopted inertial body of reference, travels equal distances.
The free body becomes a clock giving, in Lange’s words, the inertial time scale (Torretti
1983, 16-7). This simplified approach based only on the law of inertia is similar to the
adoption of sidereal time and is not far from the actual determination of the so-called
ephemeris time in terms of the whole of the dynamical laws of motion.  
With sidereal time, time is ‘materialized’ as a particular motion (that of the Earth).
The temporal parameter of the equations is equated to this particular motion, and all the
other motions are described in terms of this motion (Barbour 2009, 3-4). Sidereal time
as a particular motion is a case of a clock giving inertial time (when taking the rotation
of the Earth to be uniform).
Ephemeris  time  is  calculated,  using  Newton’s  laws,  from the  observed relative
distances, in successive ‘snapshots’, of the material bodies that are part of a physical
system taken to be isolated. One is determining the temporal parameter of the equations
in terms of the observed relative positions and motions of the celestial bodies (Barbour
2009, 5-6). As such the determination of the ephemeris time is an implementation of the
inertial time scale.14
13 Another example of body of reference is the extended material body of the gedanken experiment in c)
on page 4.
14 When considered as the temporal parameter of the equations, inertial time is, in classical mechanics,
also the global time coordinate of all the inertial reference frames. From the perspective of the theory of
relativity this hides the issue of the synchronization of clocks. In fact, the existence in classical mechanics
of a  universal  time at  all  locations of  all  the inertial  reference  frames  might result  from an implicit
assumption regarding synchrony relations in the inertial reference frames (see Torretti 1983, 13; Brown
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In general, any dynamical system (inertial or not) codifies in its motion the inertial
time scale. Examples of this are the inertial motion of free bodies, the rotation of the
Earth, the motion of a pendulum, and so on (Reichenbach 1927, 117).
Besides the dynamical systems corresponding to the inertial time scale there seems
to be two other ‘sources’ of time which might be considered independent in the present
stage of development of physics: light clocks and atomic (natural) clocks (Reichenbach
1927, 117).
Regarding  light  clocks,  it  is  not  clear  that  one  might  consider  them  to  be
independent of the inertial time scale. A light clock can be idealized, e.g., as two mirrors
with light bouncing between them. There are theoretical models of light clocks in which
they  are  independent  of  the  particularities  of  matter  (Ohanian  1976, 192-3).  These
theoretical models relying on Maxwell-Lorentz electrodynamics depend on the inertial
time scale, since one is considering electrodynamics formulated in an inertial reference
frame, and the temporal evolution of the field can be seen as described in terms of the
inertial time (Ohanian 1976, 195).15 
A different situation seems to arise with the atomic clocks. Being made of matter,
an  atomic  clock  can  be  in  inertial  or  non-inertial  motion.  As  such it  ‘codifies’  the
inertial time. However it is clear that there is something more; its ‘internal changes’ are
a ‘source’ of time, if not independent at least ‘superimposed’ to inertial time. In fact,
experimentally,  the atomic time of atomic clocks in inertial  motion is  universal,  i.e.
shared by all the atomic systems; also, it turns out that, the inertial time and atomic time
scales coincide. When comparing the rates of an atomic clock and an ephemeris clock
(defined  in  terms  of  the  motions  of  celestial  bodies),  the  deviation  between  the
clocks/scales is less than 2 x 10–10 per year (Ohanian 1976, 187-8).  This means that we
can take the time coordinate of the inertial reference frame as defined in terms of the
atomic time, as it is done, e.g., in the case of the satellites’ reference frame, in which
each satellite has an atomic clock.16 In fact, in the actuality the time scale adopted is not
the inertial time scale but the atomic time scale. It turns out that atomic clocks are much
more accurate and practical than, e.g., the implementation of the inertial time scale in
terms of the ephemeris time, which is based on astronomical observations (see, e.g.,
Jespersen and Fitz-Randolph 1999, 110).
Equivalently to the case of the conventionality of geometry there is a view that in
chronometry,  as  mathematically  conceived,  there  is  a  freedom to  adopt  or  not  the
equality  (congruence)  of  consecutive  time  intervals  and  a  freedom  to  stipulate  a
synchronization  procedure  that  enables  to  consider  that  distant  clocks  of  the  same
inertial reference frame give the same time reading simultaneously. As Poincaré called
the attention to, experimentally there is no way to determine if two consecutive time
intervals are identical (Poincaré 1898, 2-3). In this way the adoption of a uniform time
(in which we take successive time intervals to be equal) would be conventional.17 There
2005, 20).
15 It seems possible to make an equivalent argument when considering the time coordinate as determined
by the atomic time scale (see below); again electrodynamics relies on an ‘underlying’ time scale. 
16 This reasoning is being made taking into account the theory of relativity.  Thinking in terms of the
synchronization of clocks,  the time coordinate at  each position of  an inertial  reference frame can be
thought in terms of a clock located at that position, even if a dynamically described clock like the balance
wheel clock (see, e.g., Einstein 1905, 153). The conceptual change from the inertial time scale to the
atomic time scale, which is experimentally justified by the identity of the scales, results from considering
the clocks of the inertial reference frame directly as atomic clocks (see, e.g., Einstein 1907, 263; Einstein
1910, 134).
17 That there might be something conventional in the notion of uniform time,  which,  e.g.,  is  part  of
Newton’s notion of absolute time, is something that has been recurrent in the treatment of the law of
inertia.  For example d’Alembert  considered that the rectilinearity of the inertial motion is observable
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is also, according to Poincaré, another element of conventionality related to time: “we
have not even direct  intuition of the simultaneity of two [distant]  events” (Poincaré
1902,  111).  This  means,  in  the  context  of  the  theory  of  relativity,  that  when
synchronizing  distant  clocks  of  an  inertial  reference  frame,  e.g.,  by  adopting  the
Poincaré-Einstein synchronization procedure in terms of the exchange of light signals
(see,  e.g.,  Darrigol  2005),  one  would  be  implementing  a  convention.  In  fact  in
Poincaré’s view, one “admits that light has a constant velocity, and in particular that this
velocity is the same in all directions. This is a postulate without which no measure of
this velocity can be tried” (Poincaré 1898, 11).
In terms of Einstein’s approach to the conventionality of geometry, when adopting
different chronometries by choosing a different congruence relation between successive
time  intervals  and/or  a  different  synchrony  convention,  the  differences  in  the
chronometries can be compensated for by a change in the physical part of the theory.
The different versions of the theory would by experimentally indistinguishable.
Regarding the atomic time scale given by atomic clocks, it might seem that it is
possible to make a conventional choice of the time congruence. Since the atomic time is
common to all atomic systems,  one might choose a time congruence corresponding,
e.g., to a non-uniform time (making also a change in the physical part of the theory).
That is not the case. If one adopts the atomic time scale in the development of a physical
theory like Einstein did in the theory of relativity, then the atomic clock as the ‘source’
of time must be taken into account in the theory. This is done simple by taking ‘clock’
as a concept  of the theory;  but, as Einstein stresses, we must take into account that
‘clock’  must  be  seen  as  a  theoretically  self-sufficient  and independent  concept,  not
explained by the theory. One incorporates into the theory an experimental finding, that
of atomic time/clocks; but the theory does not describe these clocks as physical systems,
i.e. as solutions of G + P.
It is here that Einstein’s argument for taking Euclidean geometry to be a physical
geometry comes into play again. Like the rod is ‘transcribed’ into the theory as the line
element dr, the clock is associated directly with a time element dt at a point:  “the time
difference t2 – t1 of two events taking place at the same point of the coordinate system
can be measured directly by a clock (of identical construction for all points) set up at
this point” (Einstein 1915, 262).
There is in my view an oversimplification on Einstein’s part regarding this issue.
Regarding the space-time metric invariant ds2 = c2dt2 – dr2, Einstein mentions that it is
“directly measurable by our unit measuring-rods and clocks” (Einstein 1955, 64). This
statement is general enough to be correct even if it is not being spelled out an important
point regarding time intervals: only when considering a particular location in the inertial
reference frame is dt associated to a measurement made by just one clock. However in
several places Einstein writes statements like the following: “dr is measured directly by
a measuring-rod and dt by a clock at rest relatively to the system” (Einstein 1955, 90;
Einstein  1913a, 211;  Einstein  1914b,  33).   Only when dr  = 0 is  dt  associated  to  a
measurement made by just one clock. In general, when dr  ≠ 0, dt must be related to
measurements made by two clocks. In this case the synchronization of clocks must be
taken into account.
In relation to the first case (dr = 0) we can adopt Einstein’s view and consider a
theoretically self-sufficient conceptual clock as the counterpart of the concrete atomic
clock. In this way we can identify the time element dt (with dr = 0) directly with the
while its uniformity is not, nevertheless being possible to deduce it;  Neumann simply postulates, like
Newton, the uniformity of time; and Lange considers that the law of inertia has conventional elements in
it (see, e.g., Coelho 2007). 
8
time measurement of an atomic clock. According to Einstein, this situation precludes
any conventionality in the mathematical congruence of successive dt (with dr = 0; i.e.
corresponding to the same clock, but valid for all clocks), and the uniformity of time
follows. However this is not enough to make a case for a  physical chronogeometry,
since  in  the  chronometric  part  of  the  chronogeometry  G is  ‘included’  not  only  the
congruence of successive time intervals but also the setting of the notion of same-time-
at-a-distance, i.e. the synchrony of distant clocks. 
To my knowledge Einstein did not mention if this relation might be set in a non-
conventional  way in the context  of his  writings  on physical  geometry.18 Right  now,
based on Einstein’s argument, we can only consider that the (local) atomic time is taken
to be uniform non-conventionally; we cannot arrive at the same conclusion regarding
the coordinate time.19
When considering  the case of the inertial  time scale,  Einstein’s  argument  for a
physical uniform time seems not to apply. We do not need an independent, theoretically
self-sufficient, concept – the clock – to deal with the inertial time as implied by the
theory.  Time is  already being expressed directly in the motions.  As mentioned,  any
dynamical  system, be it  an inertial  body or e.g.,  a mechanical clock, has its  motion
described  in  terms  of  the  inertial  time;  this  means  that  from the  motion(s)  of  any
dynamical system one can determine the inertial time. The existence of the inertial time
is  already ‘implemented’  in  the  theory  and  does  not  need  any further  concept  like
‘clock’.20
In  this  approach the  time  congruence  is  not  settled.  Choosing  a  different  time
congruence leads to a reformulation of the physical part of the theory, but there is still a
shared inertial time (more exactly a global inertial time coordinate t in terms of which
all motions are described in a particular inertial reference frame).21, 22 
We could be facing a puzzling situation here. If we develop the theory of relativity
in terms of the inertial time scale without taking into account the atomic time scale (and
for the sake of the argument we will take for granted that this can be done), we arrive at
least at one conventional element in the time scale: the congruence of successive time
intervals. By adopting Einstein’s approach we arrive at a non-conventional uniform time
scale (for each clock individually; not as the time scale of the time coordinate of the
inertial  reference  frame,  for  which  it  is  necessary  to  take  into  account  the
18 This issue will be considered in section 6.
19 It is still open to discussion the exact meaning of the ‘uniformity’ of the inertial motion, since so far we
have not considered how the synchronization of clocks might affect the form of the law of inertia. If it
turns out that the synchronization is a conventional element in the mathematical structure of the theory G,
then, according to Einstein’s views, the physical part, including the law of inertia, might be affected by
the implementation of a different Gnew due to the adoption of a different synchronization procedure.
20 This does not mean that the nature of the inertial time is not up to debate. For example while Newton
took his dynamics to imply the existence of an external  absolute time, Barbour takes the laws of the
theory to express in their formulation in terms of a time parameter just the highly correlated motion of
dynamically described material bodies. The laws of the theory ‘codify’ this correlation but do not explain
it; neither there is a need to take time to be an independent concept (Barbour 2009).
21 This does not imply that from the perspective of an inertial reference frame with a t-parameter, the t’-
parameter of another inertial reference frame is taken to be equal to the t-parameter. As it is well known
this is not the case in the theory of relativity (see also footnote 22). 
22 It is important to notice that even if the synchronization procedure is not being mentioned here, it is
considered that in classical mechanics and in the theory of relativity some synchronization is possible (if
necessary), even if conventional. This means that the possibility of having a global time coordinate in
each  inertial  reference  frame is not being challenged;  also this global time coordinate is  taken to be
‘defined/determined’ in terms of the motions of material bodies or in terms of the atomic time scale (i.e.
in terms of the ‘internal clock’ of atomic systems).
9
synchronization of the clocks). Since in the present stage of development of physics
these time scales are at least to some point independent, this seems to be a possibility.
However what we already know experimentally is that the time scales are identical.
If the congruence of successive time intervals is not conventional in the case of the
atomic time scale then we are not free to choose conventionally the time congruence in
the inertial time scale.  
At this point, it is still rather undefined the exact meaning of the ‘uniformity’ of
inertial motion. Looking at the issue from the perspective of the theory of relativity, it is
undeniable that the synchronization of clocks (or some procedure to set the coordinate
time) must be taken into account;  without it  we do not even have the (global)  time
coordinate  of  the inertial  reference  frame.  Since  the relation  between the (physical)
uniform  time  of  each  clock  and  the  coordinate  time  is  ‘mediated’  by,  e.g.,  a
synchronization procedure,  the eventual direct  translation of the uniform time to the
‘uniformity’ of the inertial motion of a free body is still unclear, because it might rely
on a conventional element.
However there is already a meaning we can attribute to the ‘uniformity’ of inertial
motion. Independently of how the synchronization of clocks might affect the discussion
it is clear that both in classical mechanics as in the theory of relativity it is possible to
have a global time coordinate in each inertial reference frame. This result provides, by
now, a minimum content to the ‘uniformity of inertial motion’. It says that according to
classical mechanics and the theory of relativity there is a specific state of motion that
has associated a specific time scale. All bodies in inertial motion have the same inertial
time.23 This enables to establish a (inertial) coordinate time even if there might be some
conventional element in it. 
4 The boostability assumption
In  the  theory  of  relativity  the  rods  and  clocks  are  not  complex  physical  systems
described by the theory, e.g. as particular solutions of the mathematical equations. As
concepts  they  are  the  counterpart  of  the  concrete  rods  and  clocks  used  in
experimentation to measure lengths and time intervals. Thinking about a physical theory
in terms of an adopted mathematical structure G on top of which the physical structure
P is built (i.e. G + P), the rods and clocks are related directly to G. in fact, the metric
invariant ds2 = c2dt2 – dr2 has a direct experimental meaning, synchrony issues apart, in
terms of measurements made with a measuring-rod and clocks.
However  we  can  and  must  make  some  (provisional)  theoretical  considerations
regarding the rods and clocks as concepts of the theory,  even if the theory does not
enable to derive in an explicit way (as mathematical solutions) any result regarding the
rods and clocks.
Let us consider two inertial reference frames IRF0 and IRF1 in relative motion, and
a straight1 rod (clock) that is initially in the IRF0. We move the rod (clock) from IRF0 to
IRF1. While the rod (clock) is moving from one inertial reference frame to the other it is
23 This occurs both in classical mechanics and in the theory of relativity even if the so-called relativistic
effects might complicate the analysis of the situation. In this way if, e.g., we consider two ‘observers’ in
inertial motion that have set their respective ‘clocks’ to zero when side-by-side, we know that due to the
time  dilation  each  observers  will  consider  that  the  other  observer’s  clock  goes  slower.  However,
according to the principle of relativity both observers are physically equivalent. In particular both the
(identical) clocks must be taken to have the same rate, i.e. both clocks give time according to the inertial
or atomic time scale (see, e.g., Bohm 1965, 131-40; Smith 1965, 57; solution to problem 30 in chapter 1
of Wheeler and Taylor 1963).
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not in inertial motion. In fact if we take into account the theory we can say, even if
heuristically,  that  the  rod  (clock)  is  subjected  to  forces  that  accelerate  it  during  its
motion in-between the inertial reference frames (Brown 2005, 28). We say that the rod
(clock) was boosted from one inertial reference frame to the other.24 During its boost the
rod (clock) cannot suffer any change in its length (rate) in a way that it will not be
congruent with the rods (clocks) of  IRF1. This would contradict experimental results:
experimentally,  identical  rods  and  clocks  are  congruent  independently  of  their  past
(non-inertial) motions (Einstein 1921, 213-4).
If we consider the motion of a rod or a clock in the context of a Euclidean space,
the boost must be isotropic and we must conclude that the unaccounted for ‘internal
dynamics’ of the rod or the clock are such that the length of the rod or the rate of the
clock are unaffected by boosts in any direction.
On the other hand, if we take a conventional stance or for reasons of mathematical
formulation of the theory we adopt, e.g., a Finsler anisotropic space-time, and for the
sake of the argument we will take for granted that this can be done, we have as an
implicit  dynamical  assumption  the anisotropy of boosts of rods and clocks (Budden
1992).  In  this  case  the  rods  and  clocks  would  be  changing  their  length  and  rate
depending  on  how  they  are  moved  around,  but  in  accordance  to  the  anisotropic
geometry. 
In  both  cases  the  boosts  of  rods  and clocks  are  such that  they  agree  with  the
homogeneity of space and time, and the spatial isotropy or anisotropy. We can refer to
this result as the boostability of rods and clocks (see, e.g., Brown 2005, 30). As Einstein
mentions (Einstein 1910, 130), we can see the boostability of rods and clocks as an
assumption  implicit  in  the  theory.  However,  contrary  to  what  Einstein  writes  once
(Einstein 1920, 127), this is not an extra assumption, since it follows, in his case, from
the adoption of the physical Euclidean geometry. After developing a dynamical theory
incorporating the Euclidean geometry (associated to the inertial reference frame ‘built’
with  rods  and  clocks),  and  having  developed  dynamical  concepts  like  force,  when
reflecting on the self-sufficient  rods and clocks as a  sort  of dynamical  systems one
concludes,  heuristically,  on  the  necessity  of  the  boostability  assumption  when
considering the possibility of moving non-inertially, i.e. boosting, the rods and clocks.
In the case of the physical Euclidean geometry the boostability assumption simply says
that boosted rods and clocks do not have their length or rate affected by the boost. This
same argument is at play if one considers, e.g., an anisotropic geometry. The rods and
clocks are still theoretically self-sufficient and we need to assume the boostability of
rods and clocks, now in the sense that we take them to be affected by boosts in a way
that agrees with the adopted geometry.
5 The transformation functions between inertial reference frames
In Einstein’s approach, the Lorentz transformations, relating the coordinate systems of
two inertial  reference frames,  are deduce from two ‘postulates’:  (1) the principle  of
relativity;25 (2)  the  constancy  of  the  velocity  of  light  independently  of  the  state  of
motion  of  the  emitting  body  for  a  particular  inertial  reference  frame,  as  expected
according to Maxwell-Lorentz electrodynamics.  Taking into account the principle of
24 In this work the term ‘boost’ is used in the non-traditional sense of an ‘active’ acceleration of a body or
reference frame from a particular state of inertial motion to another (see Brown 2005).
25 The  Poincaré-Einstein principle of relativity is a generalization of Galilean relativity to all physical
phenomena (see, e.g., Paty 1994).
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relativity,  Einstein  generalizes  (2)  to  all  inertial  reference  frames  (Einstein  1905;
Einstein 1912-1914, 21-2; Einstein 1915, 250; Einstein 1914a, 307; see also Brown and
Maia 1993).
Einstein mentions, once to my knowledge, that there are some further assumptions
that must be added to the two postulates to derive the Lorentz transformations (Einstein
1920, 126-7): (1) the homogeneity of space and time; (2) the isotropy of space;  (3) the
boostability assumption.26, 27
Einstein’s approach is crucially dependent of the notion of light propagation (i.e. on
concepts from electrodynamics). Already in 1910, Ignayowsky proposed a deduction of
the  Lorentz  transformations  relying  only  on  the  principle  of  relativity  and  other
assumptions but not on electrodynamics (see, e.g., Brown 2005, 105-6). This type of
approach  has  been  presented,  with  some  variations,  by  different  authors  (see,  e.g.,
Schwartz  1962;  Levy-Leblond 1976;  Mermin  1984).  Its  main  virtues  would  be:  (1)
independence  from  electrodynamics;  (2)  showing  that  Galilean  and  Lorentz
transformations are the only options compatible with the principle of relativity.
In all cases one starts with the notion of inertial reference frame and then considers
several  other  assumptions,  which,  importantly  for  the  view being  presented  in  this
section, are taken to be extra assumptions. The most important are: (1) the principle of
relativity; (2) the homogeneity of space and time;  (3) the isotropy of space. There is an
agreement  regarding  the  necessity  of  these  assumptions  but  there  are  differences
regarding other possible assumptions and on important details.28 We will only look into
these three basic assumptions.
In this type of approach, it is considered that from the notion of inertial reference
frame plus  this  set  of  assumptions  it  is  possible  to  arrive  at  general  transformation
functions  relating  the  coordinate  systems  of  two  inertial  reference  frames.  These
functions depend on a constant K (with the dimension of the inverse of the velocity, i.e.
[K] = m–1 s). If K is set to zero one arrives at the Galilean transformations. If K is taken
to be positive, one arrives at the Lorentz transformations. The decision between the two
possibilities  can  be  made  by  reference  to  physical  phenomena,  in  particular  the
existence or not of a limit velocity (see, e.g., Lee and Kalotas 1975, 436). With a few
exceptions (see, e.g., Mermin 1984, 124 endnote 5; Feingebaum 2008, 15; Schwartz
1962, 698),  proponents  of this  approach do not take into account  the setting of the
coordinate time, usually made by considering the synchronization of clocks.
26 This is in contradiction to his view of Euclidean geometry as a physical geometry, to which Einstein
makes reference in the same text (Einstein 1920, 143-4). The homogeneity of space and time, the isotropy
of space, and the boostability of rods and clocks, all follow from the physical Euclidean geometry and the
physical uniform time.
27 This assumption is not taken into account in alternative derivations of the Lorentz transformations. An
exception in which an assumption similar to the boostability assumption is referred to is in Schwartz
(1962, 698-9).
28 According  to  different  authors  there  would  be  different  assumptions  at  play.  For  example  Levy-
Leblond  (1976)  considers  that  the  group  structure  of  the  set  of  all  transformations  between  inertial
reference frames is implicit in the definition of inertial reference frame when taking into account the
‘basic’  assumptions.  Sardelis  (1982),  on  the  other  hand,  considers  the  group  structure  as  an  extra
assumption. Mermin (1984) focus on the smoothness of the transformation as a mathematical assumption.
Feigenbaum (2008) takes the existence of a space-time point relationship to be mandatory.  Berzi and
Gorini  (1969)  consider  that  taking  the  transformation  functions  to  be  real  and  continuous  is  a
mathematical assumption. Baccetti, Tate, and Visser (2012) consider the description of space and time
using  real  numbers  as  an  assumption.  Levy-Leblond  (1976)  also  calls  the  attention  to  a  causality
assumption related to the notion of flow of time, differentiating clearly time from space. According to
him, this is fundamental to reject mathematically possible transformations that physically would entail,
e.g., the possibility of interchanging time with space.
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As it is well known, Einstein applied a method for clock synchronization, which
had already been considered by Poincaré, based on the exchange of light between clocks
(see, e.g., Darrigol 2005). If we are to define an inertial reference frame with its system
of coordinates without any reference to the light postulate then the synchronization of
clocks  must  be  made  without  resort  to  light.  Since  we  are  deducing  the  inertial
relativistic transformations in the general form between two inertial reference frames in
relative motion,  previous to the determination of what are the actual transformations
that one must adopt, Galilean or Lorentzian, the synchronization must be independent
from electrodynamics  and also compatible with classical mechanics and the theory of
relativity. 
One example of a synchronization procedure independent of the exchange of light
that seems to fit this requirement was proposed by Feigenbaum (2008, 15). It is based
on the inertial motion of free bodies and the Euclidean nature of space (in particular the
isotropy  of  space).  One  takes  two  identical  bodies  compressing  a  spring,  located
midway between two identical clocks. To simplify one can consider that the clocks are
disconnected with an initial phase set to zero. When released the two bodies will move
inertially in opposite directions, travelling equal distances at an equal time. This means
that they will arrive, each one, at each of the clocks at the same time.29 The clocks are
turned on when the bodies arrive, in this way being synchronized with the same phase. 
To  synchronize  another  clock,  one  considers  again  a  pair  of  identical  bodies
compressing a spring located midway between the clock to be synchronized and a clock
of the pair already synchronized. Let us consider that initially the clock has its phase set
to zero and is turned off, and is set on upon arrival of the material body. The material
bodies are released and one records the time of arrival to the clock of the synchronized
pair; let us say, e.g., that the clock reads 22s. Since the clocks have the same rate, the
difference of the time readings, i.e. their phase difference, will always be 22 – 0 = 22s.
One simply has to advance the time reading of the clock by 22s to synchronize it with
the other clocks. By repeating this procedure with all the clocks of the inertial reference
frame  one  synchronizes  all  the  clocks.  In  this  way  we  could  implement  a
synchronization procedure without any reference to light. 
It seems that there is nothing problematic about this type of approach to derive the
inertial relativistic transformations in the general form. However we might ask to what
point are the above-mentioned extra assumptions really independent of the notion of
inertial reference frame?
The homogeneity of space and time is taken to be a further assumption (see, e.g.
Lee  and Kalotas  1975;  Sardelis  1982;  Berzi  and Gorini  1969;  Levy-Leblond  1976;
Mermin 1984). According to Baccetti, Tate, and Visser (2012, 6-8) that cannot be the
case. Without the homogeneity assumption it would not be possible to have a notion of
inertial  reference  frame.  This  means  that  when implementing  the  notion  of  inertial
reference frame it is already implied the homogeneity of the associated mathematical
space-time.
Regarding the principle of relativity, it is taken to be an extra assumption, which is
not implied by the notion of inertial reference frame (see, e.g., Baccetti, Tate, and Visser
2012). However there is already a restricted form of the principle of relativity at play
with the notion of inertial reference frame. The law of inertia takes the same form in all
inertial reference frames, i.e. a free body has a rectilinear and uniform motion in all
29 In his synchronization procedure Feigenbaum takes into account the law of inertia in its ‘standard’
formulation.  Considering  that  the  exact  formulation  of  the  law  of  inertia  might  depend  on  the
particularities of the adopted synchronization procedure (see footnote 18), there is an eventual problem of
circularity in this approach.
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inertial reference frames (see, e.g., Einstein 1915, 248-9). Even if there are authors, like
Levy-Leblond (1976), that consider that they are using the principle of relativity in a
very generic way compatible with different relativistic theories, in their derivation of the
transformation  functions  between  the  coordinate  systems  of  two  inertial  reference
frames they apply the  principle  only in  the restricted  form as related  to  the law of
inertia.
One might argue that even if this is so, the notion of inertial reference frame is only
meaningfully defined by reference to the whole of the laws of the theory. This implies
that one is considering the principle of relativity in a general form, that of the theory
implicitly being considered. But this also means that there is a flaw in the approach of
deriving  inertial  relativistic  transformations  in  the  general  form  between  inertial
reference  frames  that  only  afterwards  becomes  the  Galilean  transformations  or  the
Lorentz transformations. If we do not consider the physical theories in the first place it
might make no sense to consider on their own inertial reference frames, free bodies, and
the law of inertia.
Regarding  the  isotropy of  space,  from the  point  of  view of  Einstein’s  physical
geometry, Euclidean geometry is the geometry applicable to material bodies in inertial
motion, i.e. it is the geometry of the inertial reference frames. In this way we do not
need the isotropy of space as a further assumption; it is included in the nature of the
Euclidean geometry. If for the sake of the argument, from a conventionalist stance or
due to a choice in the mathematical formulation of the theory, one adopts an anisotropic
geometry, the anisotropy of space would not be a further assumption but an aspect of
the adopted geometry that, like Euclidean geometry, must nevertheless correspond to a
homogeneous space.
From this  point  of  view  none  of  the  basic  assumptions  are  extra  assumptions
necessary in the derivation of the Lorentz transformations without the light postulate;
they are already implied in the notion of inertial  reference frame with its associated
geometry. However, some care is necessary. Even if mathematically it is possible the
derivation of inertial  relativistic transformations in the general form that would then
become the Galilean  transformations  or  the  Lorentz  transformations,  conceptually  it
might  be  troublesome to consider  the notion  of  inertial  reference  frame on its  own
outside a dynamical theory. 
In the case of Einstein’s derivation, the principle of relativity is at play in its full
generality. However, the homogeneity of space and time and the isotropy of space are
already implied in the (physical) Euclidean geometry and the (physical) uniform time,
as it is the case with the boostability assumption.30
6 The possible conventionality in the synchronization of clocks of an inertial reference
frame
In Einstein’s approach, the ‘light postulate’ is an essential element in the deduction of
the  Lorentz  transformations.  According  to  Einstein,  following  Maxwell-Lorentz
30 The view being presented here has some similitude but also important  differences with Schwartz’s
approach to the derivation of the Lorentz transformations (see,  e.g.,  Schwartz 1962; Schwartz 1984).
Schwartz considers a set of necessary and sufficient postulates or assumptions. Two of them are: (a) the
geometry of space in R is three-dimensional Euclidean, where R is a limited space-time region; (b) Time
is homogeneous in R. However Schwartz is considering the Euclidean geometry and uniform time as
basic  assumption/postulates  associated  to  the  inertial  reference  frame.  In  the  case  of  Einstein  this
connexion is not a sort of axiomatic choice but results from the identification of geometry with physical
geometry and from a physical uniform time.
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electrodynamics there is at least one inertial reference frame in which light propagates
with a velocity c that is independent of the motion of the emitting body. This ‘postulate’
together  with the principle  of relativity  implies  according to  Einstein that  light  also
propagates  with velocity  c  in any other inertial  reference frame.  One way in which
Einstein  arrives  at  the  Lorentz  transformations  is  by  considering  the  equations
describing  the  propagation  of  a  spherical  wave  in  two  inertial  reference  frames  in
relative motion. The equations have the same form (with the same constant c) in the two
inertial  reference  frames.  From  these  equations  Einstein  deduces  the  Lorentz
transformations (see, e.g., Einstein 1907).
The propagation of light enters Einstein’s approach at an even more basic level;
that of defining the time coordinate of an inertial reference frame. As mentioned, to
‘spread’ time in an inertial reference frame it is necessary to synchronize (i.e. set the
phase  of)  identical  clocks  of  the  inertial  reference  frame.  Like  Poincaré,  Einstein
proposes  a  protocol  to  synchronize  the  clocks  based  on  the  propagation  of  light,
according to which “the time required by light to travel from A to B equals the time it
requires to travel from B to A” (Einstein 1905).
Einstein’s approach leads to the view that there is an element of conventionality in
the synchronization procedure. This approach is supposed to suffer from a circularity
problem: to have clocks in phase in an inertial reference frame we need to exchange
light signals. This presupposes that the velocity of light in each direction (the one-way
speed of light) is the same. However the determination of the one-way speed of light is
only possible after we have a time coordinate associated to the inertial reference frame
(i.e.  after  we set  the phase of the clocks).  This  situation  leads  to  the view that  the
equality of the one-way speed of light in different directions and the synchronization of
distant  clocks  of  an  inertial  reference  frame  is  a  matter  of  convention  (see,  e.g.,
Anderson, Vetharaniam, and Stedman, 1998, 96).
There is a view according to which a synchronization procedure presupposing an
anisotropic velocity of light (i.e. a different one-way speed of light depending on the
direction)  corresponds to a  coordinate  system different  from the one arising from a
synchronization in which one adopts the convention of an isotropy velocity of light; i.e.
different  synchronization  conventions  correspond  to  a  recoordinatization  within  the
same inertial reference frame (see, e.g., Giannoni 1978, 23). Since any physical theory
can be formulated in a generally covariant way, one might have the impression that the
so-called  conventionality  of  the  one-way speed of  light  is  but  a  trivial  example  of
general covariance (see, e.g., Norton 1992). 
A  somewhat  different  way  to  look  at  this  situation  is  to  take  the  choice  of  a
different one-way speed of light (and corresponding coordinate system) as an example
of a gauge freedom in the theory of relativity. Some authors mention the gauge freedom
simply  as  meaning  the  possibility  of  a  recoordinatization  (see,  e.g.,  Anderson,
Vetharaniam, and Stedman,  1998, 98).  It is  simply a different  way to say the same
thing. However there are different interpretations of gauge freedom that go beyond that.
According to Rynasiewicz (2011), in simple terms, the Minkowski space-time is only
determined  up  to  a  diffeormophism  of  the  metric.  What  this  means  is  that  the
Minkowski space-time does not have one defined light cone structure; depending on the
stipulation  of  the  one-way  velocity  of  light  there  is  a  tilting  of  the  light  cone
(Rynasiewicz 2011, 5; see also Edwards 1963). These different light cone structures are
physically equivalent and correspond to different conventional choices of a criterion for
distant  simultaneity.  In  Rynasiewicz’s  view this  situation  does  not  correspond to  a
passive transformation of the coordinate system of the Minkoswki space-time to another
coordinate system. What we have is an active transformation of the “Minkoswki space-
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time  to  a  new  Minkoswki  space-time”  (Rynasiewicz  2011,  7).  Thinking  about  the
Minkoswki  space-time  in  terms  of  a  manifold  E4 in  which  it  is  defined a  metrical
structure  η, when applying a diffeomorphism d to the Minkoswki space-time  〈E4,  η〉,
one is so to speak implementing a new Minkoswki space-time 〈E4, d*η〉.
At  this  point  one  might  think  that  this  situation  is  different  from the  so-called
conventionality of geometry. In my view that is not the case. Adopting Einstein’s view
in  terms  of  a  physical  geometry,  the  space  and  time  congruences  are  the  ones
corresponding to the homogeneous and isotropic case. This might give the impression
that  the  chronogeometry  is  settled,  and  that  when  adopting  a  different  synchrony
convention  one  is  simply  changing  the  coordinate  system.  However  to  make  a
recoordinatization one needs a coordinate system in the first place. The conventional
choice of the one-way speed of light does not enter at the level of changing from a
coordinate system to another, but in setting up the coordinate system in the first place.
To have a global time coordinate it is necessary to relate in a meaningful way the time
reading at different spatial locations of the inertial reference frame. We are considering
identical clocks (i.e. clocks that have the same rate), which correspond mathematically
to congruent time intervals for each clock (i.e. to an uniform time). But this does not
seem to set the relation between their phases (i.e. the clocks are not yet synchronized
and because of this one does not have a global time coordinate defined in the inertial
reference  frame).  As  Einstein  mentions,  the  time  coordinate  (that  he  also  calls  the
physical time) is defined by the synchronization procedure (Einstein 1910, 125-7). If
this procedure is a conventional choice then it is the chronogeometry associated to the
inertial reference frame that is being chosen conventionally.
This sheds new light on the view of the setting of the one-way speed of light as an
example of gauge freedom of the theory. The gauge freedom of the theory results on
different metrics (that are transformable via a diffeomorphism into the Lorentz metric),
i.e.  the setting  of  different  but physically  equivalent  geometries.  As such the  gauge
freedom refers to  something prior to the recoordinatization;  it  is  related to a  partial
freedom in implementing a coordinate system prior to any change to another coordinate
system.
In  my view,  what  Rynasiewicz  calls  the  active  transformation  of  a  Minkowski
space-time with a metric η to a Minkowski space-time with a metric d*η, corresponds
to different initial  settings of the distant simultaneity relation in an inertial  reference
frame,  which  corresponds  to  different  choices/implementations  of  a  Minkowskian
chronogeometry.31
The difference  between these geometries  is  the stipulation  of  different  one-way
speeds of light.  This means that depending on the particular Minkowskian geometry
31 There are other authors that, from a different perspective, implicitly, make of the conventionality of
distant  simultaneity  a  case  of  conventionality  of  geometry.   In  this  view  the  anisotropy  of  light
propagation is not a feature of light ‘itself’ but of the underlying mathematical space (see, e.g., Budden
1997, Ungar 1986). In the case of the theory of relativity we would not have anymore a spatial Euclidean
geometry corresponding to the four dimensional Minkowski space-time. Due to the anisotropy of the
three-dimensional space we would have a Finsler space-time. This would make the conventionality of the
one-way  speed  of  light  (or  equivalently  the  conventionality  of  distant  simultaneity)  a  case  of  the
conventionality of (spatial) geometry,  to be addressed as such. Einstein’s view that implies taking the
spatial Euclidean geometry to be the physical spatial geometry of the theory excludes taking the choice of
a  Finsler  geometry  as  a  possible  conventional  choice  of  the  geometry,  even  if  it  turns  out  to  be
mathematically an option in the case of the theory of relativity. Taking for granted that this might be done
its justification would not arise as a possible conventional choice but, e.g., to enable to take into account
eventual observable anisotropic phenomena corresponding to a violation of Lorentz invariance (see, e.g.,
Bogoslovsky 2005). Ultimately, this would imply a change of the theory of relativity. 
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adopted,  one also adopts a  particular  formulation  of  electrodynamics;  the ‘standard’
isotropic electrodynamics, or an anisotropic electrodynamics (see, e.g., Giannoni 1978).
What we have then, when adopting a gauge interpretation of the conventionality of
distant simultaneity, is a case of Einstein’s version of the conventionality of geometry.
In  one  case  we have  the  standard  metric  corresponding to  an  isotropic  light  speed
described by the standard isotropic electrodynamics (GS + PI); in the other case we have
a non-standard Minkowskian geometry with an anisotropic electrodynamics (GNS + PA). 
It seems that we are facing a limitation in Einstein’s view of geometry as physical
geometry.  According to  Einstein  we can adopt  the  spatial  Euclidean  geometry as  a
physical  geometry;  also  we  can  make  a  similar  case  regarding  the  congruence  of
successive  time  intervals  (associated  to  any  clock  at  any  location  in  the  inertial
reference frame); this means taking time to be uniform. However we still have left out
the definition of a global time coordinate in the inertial reference frame for which it is
necessary  to  synchronize  the  clocks.  It  is  here  that  we  would  find  an  element  of
conventionality due to the physical equivalence of diffeomorphically related Minkowski
space-times. The exact definition of the light cone structure would be stipulated in terms
of a particular (conventional) gauge choice. In this way the chronogeometry of space-
time would not be a completely physical chronogeometry.   
This might not be the case. As mentioned, when making a derivation of the Lorentz
transformations  without  the  light  postulate  the  synchronization  procedure  must  be
independent  of  the  propagation  of  light.  Without  this  the  approach  would  be
inconsistent.  Granting  that  this  can  be  done,  e.g.,  by  adopting  Feigenbaum’s
synchronization  procedure,  then  with  a  small  change  in  his  approach  it  might  be
possible to avoid the conventionality of the synchronization of distant clocks.32 
To start with, the argument for the conventionality of the synchronization of distant
clocks arises due to a circularity in adopting a defined one-way speed of light previous
to the clocks’ synchronization, without taking into account that the one-way speed of
light can only be determined if we already have synchronized clocks. Since we do not
consider  light  propagation  anymore,  it  is  not  immediate  that  there  is  a  circularity
problem. 
Instead  of  considering  the  synchronization  in  terms  of  inertial  material  bodies
making reference to the law of inertia (which might imply some conventional element
due to the application  of the law of  inertia  in  its  standard form previous  to having
synchronized clocks), we will consider atomic clocks in inertial motion.
Let us consider two atomic clocks compressing a spring, located midway between
two clocks. All the clocks are initially turned off. Upon releasing, the atomic clocks are
set on.  We find out that  when arriving at  the clocks to be synchronized the atomic
clocks read the same time. The clocks at rest in the inertial reference frame are set on
with an initial phase equal to the time reading of the atomic clocks. The identical time
interval  measured  by  the  atomic  clocks  in  inertial  motion  is  taken  to  be  non-
conventional, since we are considering time to be uniform in a non-conventional way
(i.e. as a physical uniform time). This implies that when setting the time of the clocks at
rest in the inertial  reference frame (i.e. when synchronizing the clocks) this is made
without  any conventional  element  at  play.  In  this  approach  the  ‘uniformity’  of  the
inertial motion (i.e. the standard formulation of the law of inertia) results from a non-
circular synchronization procedure in which the physical uniform time of atomic clocks
in  inertial  motion  is  the  only  relevant  element  taken  into  account.  Being  non-
conventional the whole of the chronogeometry means that the physical structure is also
32 Feigenbaum’s synchronization procedure is not free from a possible conventional element since it relies
on the law of inertia in its ‘standard’ formulation (see also footnotes 18 and 28).
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non-conventional.33 In particular, the law of inertia ‘codifies’ the physical uniform time
of the atomic time scale and the inertial time scale.
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